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Essentialism, Culture, and Beliefs About Gender
Among the Aravanis of Tamil Nadu, India
Ramaswami Mahalingam1
The purpose of this study was to investigate the gender beliefs of the Aravanis, a transgen-
der community in Tamil Nadu. Gender transgression and gender transformation (attempts to
change gender) tasks were used to examine the essentialist notions of the Aravanis’ beliefs
about gender. A total of 100 Aravanis participated in the study. In the gender transgression task
the Aravanis endorsed both male and female gender transgressions. In the gender transfor-
mation task the Aravanis believed in the male to female transformation but not in the female
to male transformation. I argue that the asymmetry in the Aravanis’ responses suggests that
their beliefs about gender are consistent with Hindu patriarchal beliefs that feminine gender
is essential and primordial, whereas masculine gender transformations are viewed as part of
the male prerogative. The marginalized gender experience of the Aravanis influenced their
judgments about gender transgressions but not their beliefs about gender transformations. I
also discuss the implications of a cultural psychology of gender.
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The main purpose of this paper is to examine the
role of social location and marginality (Fiske, 1993) in
essentialist beliefs about gender (Fuss, 1989; Taylor,
1996). Gender theorists and feminists have objected
to the essentialization of gender on two grounds. First,
essentialist thinking has been rejected because of its
dichotomous masculine/feminine assumptions about
gender. For example, several ethnographic reports of
non-Western cultures suggest the fluidity in gender
roles (Trawick, 1990; Wiken, 1982). Second, essential-
ism has been viewed as an ideological tool of those in
power, and, for this reason, essentialist beliefs about
gender are resisted by those who are at the margins
(Fiske, 1993; Stoler, 1995). This paper addresses the
following two theoretical concerns: (a) whether mem-
bers of an alternate gender group essentialize gender;
and (b) whether their marginalized gender status has
any influence on their beliefs about gender.
1To whom correspondence should be addressed at Department of
Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-
1109; e-mail: ramawasi@umich.edu.
Gender and Essentialism
Previous research on gender roles has docu-
mented children’s recognition of gender constancy
(Bem, 1981, 1993). Gender role research docu-
ments the stages of development that mark qualita-
tive changes in children’s beliefs about gender. Re-
cent research on cognitive development (Gelman &
Wellman, 1990) suggests that even young children
have a “theory like” understanding of social cate-
gories such as race (Hirschfeld, 1996, 1997) and gen-
der (Taylor, 1996). Cognitive essentialism refers to an
early cognitive bias, a heuristic cognitive tool used
to make inferences about various social categories.
This early cognitive bias provides a causal mecha-
nism to explain a social phenomenon such as race,
caste, or gender. For instance, Taylor (1996) found that
even 4–5-year-olds believed in essentialist notions of
gender. Folk theories of social groups are driven by
an essentialist bias to assign social groups a distinct
ontological status. Granting such a status also pre-
sumes that the group has an essence that is immutable
and unchangeable. The “fixed” nature of the essence
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is believed to result from a biological mechanism
(e.g., blood, gene, DNA) or to be socially transmitted
(Mahalingam, 1998).
Social essentialism refers to the belief that essen-
tialism is an ideological tool that legitimizes power
relations (Fuss, 1989; Grosz, 1994). The intuitive ap-
peal of essentialism to make things appear natural has
been deployed to justify existing power structures that
favor those in privileged positions. According to crit-
ics, a belief in a biological basis for group differences
also tends to legitimize social hierarchies along race,
class, and gender lines. The link between social power
and essentialism has been pointed out by feminists
and critical theorists (e.g., Fuss, 1989; Grosz, 1994).
Feminists argue that essentialism has been invoked
to justify gender differences.
According to Grosz (1994),
Women’s essence is assumed to be given and uni-
versal and is usually, though not necessarily, iden-
tified with women’s “biology” and “natural charac-
teristics.” There are cases in which women’s essence
is seen to reside not in nature or biology but in cer-
tain given psychological characteristics—nurturance,
empathy, supportiveness, non-competitiveness. Es-
sentialism thus refers to the existence of fixed char-
acteristics, given attributes, and ahistorical functions
that limit the possibility of change and thus of social
organization. (p. 84)
Although many feminist psychologists have ques-
tioned essentialist representations, some feminist the-
orists have also favored the strategic use of essential-
ism, the need to have a corporal entity, in order to
construct a discourse for the empowerment of women
(Spivak, 1989).
The social and cognitive approaches to essential-
ism emphasize different aspects of beliefs about gen-
der, and they raise some interesting questions about
how to think about gender. Theorists from both per-
spectives agree (to different degrees) that essentialist
beliefs about gender form the basis of gender stereo-
types. What are the specific contexts in which essen-
tialist discourse of gender is invoked? Such discourse
cannot occur in a social vacuum or only in textual
modes.
Social psychological research shows that when-
ever people display counter stereotypical behavior,
their actions are judged more negatively by others
(Fiske, 1993; Signorella & Liben, 1985). Typically,
such critical evaluation of counter stereotypic gender
or ethnic behaviors, such transgressions from group
norms (e.g., aggressive Japanese or nurturing men),
presupposes an essentialist reasoning where people
deviate from the way they “ought” to behave. In the
case of gender, Fiske (1993) argued that the power
of gender stereotypes is that they prescribe what men
or women ought to be, and any deviant behavior is
punished or judged especially negatively. Therefore,
an evaluation of gender transgressions would be valu-
able in helping us to understand the complex interac-
tions among gender, culture, and power.
Aravanis, the Transgressors
Feminist psychologists contest the universaliza-
tion of male/female dichotomy as a dominant axis to
understand gender. Ethnographic reports suggest that
several cultures have alternate conceptions of gen-
der that defy the Western assumption of a bipolar
conception of gender. Wiken (1982) documented the
presence of Xaniths, the in-between status of men, in
Oman. Xaniths are men who dress differently from
most men but not entirely like women. They provide
homosexual service to men who are not Xaniths. Their
Xanith status is temporary and can be reversed by
performing a manly sexual act with a woman from a
dominant sexual position (Wiken, 1982).
Callender and Kochems (1986) studied the
Beradache tradition among Native Americans.
Beradaches are typically males who abdicate their
gender status. As “not” males, who embody the
essence of both males and females, they are believed
to possess spiritual powers. Often Beradaches are
the shamans for their communities. Nanda (1990)
studied Hijras (also called Aravanis in Tamil Nadu,
South India). Aravanis are men who dress as women
and take nontraditional male occupations (e.g., cooks,
dancers). They also provide homosexual service to
non-Aravani men. In characterizing the “not men”
Callender and Kochems (1986) observed four features
that are common to all these “not-men” categories,
some of which distinguish them from Western no-
tions of homosexuals: (a) they dress differently from
most men; (b) they do not have sexual relationships
with women; (c) they seek occupations that are non-
traditional; (d) they do not have any sexual relation-
ships among themselves.
Nanda’s ethnographic research on Hijras
(Nanda, 1990) confirmed Callender and Kochem’s
characterization. According to Nanda, an unofficial
account lists about 500,000 Hijras all over India. The
British ethnographic reports (Agrawal, 1997) docu-
mented the presence of castrated men, also called
Hijras. In north India, there is a tradition of asking
Hijras to bless newborn babies. Hijras are considered
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auspicious because they embody both males’ and
females’ spirits. Nanda (1990) characterizes them as
a “third gender” that is neither male nor female.
In Tamil Nadu, Hijras are known as Aravanis.
Most of them do not finish high school because they
are constantly teased by their peers. They dress in
saris, give themselves feminine names, and refer to
each other in female kinship terms. After becoming
Aravanis, most of them leave their natal homes, and
join the Aravani community. They are shunned by
family members, especially their male kin, and of-
fer material as well as emotional support to each
other. Aravanis are more than cross-dressers. Many
go through a sex change operation or take hormones
to become a “perfect” female, and many also become
sex workers to serve non-Aravani men. At times they
maintain a monogamous relationship with a man they
call a husband.
The general public reaction to the Aravanis has
been ambivalent, a mixture of awe and disgust. Often
they are objects of ridicule and serve as a metaphor for
impotence, a symbol for a man who lacks masculinity.
However, in north India, one of the Hijras recently
ran successfully for an election to the state assembly.
Aravanis are very proud of their gender trans-
gressions, but so far, there has been no systematic
study of the Aravanis’ beliefs about gender. Most an-
thropological accounts use Aravanis as an example
(Agrawal, 1997; Nanda, 1990; Vedanthan, 2001) to
challenge the dichotomous notion of gender as male
or female. Vedanthan (2001) argued that the Aravanis
overidentify with women and try to “mimic” (Bhabha,
1994) the feminine ideal. However, there has been
no systematic cognitive psychological study of their
beliefs about gender. The Aravanis are an interest-
ing group for studying essentialist beliefs about gen-
der for a number of reasons. First, as gender trans-
gressors, their everyday lived experiences challenge
many essentialized notions about gender. Second, the
marginalized status of the Aravanis provides an op-
portunity to examine the interactions among essen-
tialism, power, and social location.
The Present Study
The purpose of this study was to investigate the
Aravanis’ implicit theories of gender. Aravanis are
living examples of gender transgression, and gender-
bending is central to their identity. They dress and act
like women and pride themselves on being “super-
women.” If they are a “third gender” (Nanda, 1990),
will their gender theories be different from those
prevalent in the dominant culture? As they seem to
transcend the masculine/feminine dichotomy, do they
subscribe to a more fluid, nonessentialist notion of
gender? The major prediction was that the Arvanis’
theories of gender would be fluid. To examine essen-
tialist beliefs about gender, two gender tasks were de-
veloped: (1) a gender transformation task (GTR), and
(2) a gender transgression task (GTRG). The gen-
der transformation task uses four different transfor-




Informal estimates suggest that there are at least
10,000 Aravanis in Madurai, a southern city in Tamil
Nadu. Through a snowball sampling method, 100
Aravanis (Age M = 31.84, SD= 7.84) were recruited
through personal contacts from the city of Madurai.
When approached, all participants were enthusiastic
about participating in the study. Among the partici-
pants, 52.4% did not finish high school, 42% finished
high school, and 99% were earning less than 24,000
rupees a year (approximately about $480 a year). All
of them were from Hindu backgrounds.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of
the two story conditions. After listening to a story,
participants were asked to judge the appropriateness
of the gender transgression for each of the eight cross-
gender characteristics (see Appendix A) on a 5-point
Likert scale (1= very inappropriate to 5= very appro-
priate). The order of presentation of the items was ran-
domized. The mean score across the eight responses
on the scale is the gender transgression score (GTRG)
for each participant (see Appendix B). A higher score
means that the desired gender transgression is judged
more negatively, and a lower score means that the
gender transgression is judged less negatively by the
participant.
Procedure
Participants were interviewed at a time and place
convenient for them. To accommodate their work
schedule, the interviews were conducted over a period
of 2 weeks, with a separate session for each task. Each
participant completed the gender transgression and
the gender transformation task followed by a general
demographic questionnaire. On average, each session
took between 10 and 12 min. Two native speakers
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of Tamil were trained to present the task. The tasks
were translated by a bilingual translator from English
to Tamil and later back translated by another bilin-
gual translator into English and verified for accuracy.
The Tamil translations were modified to the satisfac-
tion of the two translators.
Gender Transgression Task
The gender transgression task consisted of two
story types. One story (Story A) provided a brief de-
scription of a boy who acts like a girl. Another version
described a story of a girl who acts like a boy (Story B).
There were eight behavioral items that are stereotyp-
ical of either males or females (see appendix A). The
participants were asked to judge the appropriateness
of the cross-gender behavior on a Likert scale that
ranged from 1 to 5 (1 = most inappropriate and 5 =
most appropriate). The gender stereotypical nature
of the items were rated by 10 native speakers (5 men
and 5 women). There was 95% agreement between
the raters.
Gender Transformation Task
The same participants were randomly assigned
to one of the two story conditions. In one condition,
participants listened to the story of a girl who wanted
to become a boy (Story A), and in the other partici-
pants listened to the story of a boy who wanted to be-
come a girl (Story B). After the vignette was read, the
protagonist in the story was provided with four differ-
ent mechanisms for gender transformation. The four
mechanisms were (a) superficial change; (b) surgical
change; (c) change initiated by a Guru; (d) change
by good Karma. Each mechanism was presented in
the form of a vignette (see Appendix B). The super-
ficial transformation (GTR1) suggests that by chang-
ing one’s clothes and gender specific behavior, one can
change one’s gender. The second mechanism (GTR2)
suggests that a surgical procedure will change gen-
der. The third mechanism (GTR3) presents the pos-
sibility that a Guru (a holy person) can change one’s
gender. The last vignette (GTR4) suggests that good
Karma can change one’s gender (i.e., if one does a lot
of good things in this life, in the next life one can born
with a gender of one’s choice). The interviewer read
the story and presented each mechanism. The order
of presentation of the mechanisms was randomized.
Participants were then asked to judge the likelihood
of changing one’s gender by each means on a Likert
scale (1= very unlikely to change to 5= very likely to
change). A higher score means that the desired gen-
Fig. 1. Gender transformation scores by story type. The higher
score indicates that the transformation mechanism is more likely
to change the gender. GTR1=Superficial transformation; GTR2=
by surgery; GTR3 = by a Guru; GTR4 = by good Karma.
der transformation is more likely to happen, and a
lower score means that the gender transformation is
less likely to happen. The mean scores for each vi-
gnette by story type are shown in Appendix B, Fig. 1.
RESULTS
In this study of transgression I explored two gen-
eral theoretical questions: (1) whether Aravanis were
tolerant of gender transgressions; (2) whether there
was a main effect for the story type. To answer these
questions, an analysis of variance of GTRG scores was
conducted.
In general, the Aravanis approved of gender
transgressions. The mean scores for Story A and Story
B were 4.9 (SD= 0.9) and 5.0 (SD= 0.0), respectively.
A one-way analysis of variance of GTR scores by story
type (nature of transgression: male transgression and
female transgression) showed no main effect for story
type. The findings suggest that the Aravanis tolerate
gender transgression irrespective of the direction of
the story type.
The theoretical questions of interest for each
mechanism in the transformation study are (1)
whether the Aravanis believed in changing gender,
and (2) whether there was a main effect for story type.
The gender transformation scores were calculated for
each mechanism (GTR1, GTR2, GTR3, and GTR4).
There was a significant main effect for story type
for each mechanism. A one-way analysis of variance
of the GTR1 scores showed a main effect for story
type, F(1, 97) = infinity, p < 0.000001 (F value ap-
proached infinity because there was no variation in
the responses for both versions). A boy was seen as
being more likely to be able to become a girl than
girl was to become a boy. A similar story effect, in
the same direction was found for GTR2, the surgical
mechanism, F(1, 97)= 790.3, p < .00001. For GTR3,
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there was no story effect. That is, a holy person can-
not change the gender of a boy or a girl. However,
the story effect was in the opposite direction for the
Karma vignette, F(1, 97) = 14.3, p < .0001. A signif-
icantly higher number of Aravanis believed that a girl
was more likely to become a boy in the next life be-
cause of good Karma than a boy was to become a girl.
DISCUSSION
The Aravanis’ beliefs about gender were com-
plex. They generally believed that a girl could not
become a boy, whereas a boy could become a girl.
This trend was true for all mechanisms except for the
Karma mechanism; they believed that good Karma
might change a woman into a man in the next life.
The story effect was the strongest for the super-
ficial transformation (GTR1). The Aravanis believed
that if the boy dressed like a girl and acted like a girl,
he would become a girl. They also believed that a
girl would never become a boy by changing her dress
or the way she acts. The Aravanis also thought that
surgery would transform a boy into a girl but not a girl
into a boy, and the differences in judgment scores be-
tween story types were significant. They also believed
that a Guru could not change a boy into a girl or a girl
into a boy.
The transformation tasks tapped the Aravanis’
essentialist beliefs about gender and also provided
opportunities to explore whether the Aravanis have a
fluid notion of gender. Indeed, the Aravanis held fluid
a notion of male identity but not female identity. They
essentialized female identity more than male identity.
The most significant difference was found for the su-
perficial transformation task (GTR1).
Many gender constancy tasks in the developmen-
tal psychology literature have been designed to de-
termine the age at which children understand that
cross-dressing will not make a boy into a girl or a girl
into a boy (Bem, 1981, 1993). At the outset, the re-
sponse pattern of Aravanis may look similar to those
of younger children who did not have an elaborate
theory-like understanding of gender. By contrast, I ar-
gue that the Aravanis’ theory of gender is more elab-
orate and is rooted in their experience, as well as in
culture-specific beliefs about gender. There is one im-
portant difference between Aravanis and young chil-
dren. Unlike young children who believed that cross-
dressing would change the boy into a girl and a girl
into a boy, there were asymmetries in the Aravanis’ es-
sentialist representations of gender. The Aravanis’ re-
sponses indicated that they believe that female iden-
tity is more essential than male identity; they believe
in the permeability and fluidity of the male identity
but not of female identity.
However, the Aravanis were more gender egal-
itarian when it comes to gender transgressions. The
duality of their lived experience (as males who are
not-men, but rather hyperwomen who transgress the
accepted gender norms of males) might have height-
ened their sensitivity to gender crossing. This expe-
rience likely resulted in their egalitarian attitudes
toward gender transgressions but not to gender trans-
formation. Therefore, the Aravanis did not judge gen-
der transgressions as inappropriate, irrespective of the
gender of the transgressor.
Perhaps the Aravanis’ notions of gender are
driven simultaneously by two separate aspects of
cultural experiences: one that guides their gender
egalitarian norms, and another that shapes their
essentialist notions of gender. Their marginalized and
stigmatized lived experience as Aravanis might have
contributed to their tolerance and acceptance of gen-
der transgressions. They seemed to apply their egal-
itarian norms equally to male and female gender
transgressors. Their social location played a role in
a tolerant and a (relatively speaking) liberal view of
gender within the Indian context. This finding is con-
sistent with the claims of feminist standpoint episte-
mology (Harding, 1991), which posits that marginal-
ized experience provides a standpoint that is more
objective, egalitarian, and equitable. For example,
a comparison of Blacks and Whites on egalitar-
ian measures suggests that marginalized groups are
more likely to endorse hierarchy attenuating beliefs,
whereas dominant group members endorsed hierar-
chy enhancing beliefs (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
Culture, Gender, and Power
An essentialist representation of female identity,
as a prevailing cultural ideology, is particularly salient
for upper caste Brahmins. As interlocutors of the
canonical forms of Hinduism and Hindu Scriptures,
they strongly endorse essentialist representations
of women. In a study conducted in Tamil Nadu, I
(Mahalingam, 2001) examined beliefs about gender
among Tamil Brahmins, using the gender transgres-
sion and gender transformation tasks. Brahmins,
particularly Brahmin males, essentialized female
gender more than did members of other caste groups.
Although the Aravanis did not selectively essential-
ize female gender in the gender transgression task,
they did essentialize female gender more than male
gender.
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The cultural construction of gender in India dif-
fers from gender concepts in the United States. For in-
stance, Feinman (1981) found that Americans tolerate
feminine gender role transgressions but not mascu-
line gender role transgressions. The fluidity of gender
identity has apparently been granted for women but
not for men. Male identity is essential and associated
with power, and the male gender transgression in the
United States is associated with loss of status, whereas
in India male gender transgression is viewed as a male
prerogative (Trawick, 1990).
In Indian culture, the belief in goddess worship
is linked to an essential representation of female
identity as pure, strong, and powerful. Evidence
from Indian folklore and mythology also suggests
that female identity is seen as the core essence of
gender, from which male identity emerges. Instances
of gender transformation are abundant in cultural
and religious myths. In such popular representa-
tions, typically a male becomes a female. There are
very few instances of females becoming males. An
important exception is the case of Ambai, a lead
female character in the epic Mahabharata (Narayan,
2000). In the story, Ambalika vowed to reincarnate
as a male warrior so that she could fight Bhisma to
protect her honor. However, in the battlefield, when
her reincarnate Sikandi encountered Bhishma in the
battle field, Bhishma refused to fight Sikandi because
he knew that deep inside he was Ambalika, a woman.
Although at the mythological level harming a woman
is against the honor code of warriors, in everyday
life the constrictive nature of female identity, as well
as asymmetries in beliefs about gender, become an
excuse to legitimize violence against women and con-
trol women’s power to choose nontraditional gender
roles.
The findings from the present study raise some
interesting theoretical questions, both in showing the
complexities of essentialist notions of gender and the
interaction between essentialism and marginalized
epistemologies (Harding, 1991). One major issue
has been whether the essentialist representation
of gender, the belief in a corporeality of women,
is a unitary belief system that navigates both our
interpretation of various performative aspects of
gender and the cultural grammar of moral derivatives
for judging such gender transgressions. The Aravanis’
beliefs about gender offer some insights about the
complex interaction between social location and lived
experiences. My findings suggest that essentialist
representations of gender are multidimensional. The
transformative and behavioral aspects of gender may
be independent of each other.
Harding (1991) claimed that marginalized
epistemologies would be empowering and would
provide alternate perspectives that would challenge
dominant beliefs about social categories. Standpoint
epistemologists have argued that a marginalized
social location provides a unique theoretical vantage
point that embodies lived experience, challenges
essentialized representations, and values “other-
ness,” “alienation,” and “bifurcation” (Brown, 1989;
Daly, 1973; Harding, 1991). In her work on gay and
bisexual psychology, Brown (1989) emphasized that
marginality is a core experience that is constitutive
of both gay and lesbian identities:
Lesbian and gay male experience reflects the alien-
ated, marginal world view, no matter how well an in-
dividual lesbian or gay man appears to be integrated
into the dominant social context . . .our experience
of the world as outsiders may allow us to see differ-
ently, hear differently, and this potentially challenges
the conventional wisdom. We may be freer to see, to
speak, and to act other truths. (pp. 171–172)
Brown’s provocative portrayal of the affirming
characteristics of marginalized experience needs to
be examined in relation to the Aravanis’ beliefs about
gender. Certainly, their marginalized experiences
seem to influence the way they rethink the behavioral
aspects of gender and gender roles in general. They
were able to uncouple beliefs about doing gender
from their core beliefs about changing gender. Being
transgressors themselves, they condone male as
well as female transgressions. However, the cultural
representations of gender also influenced the gender
beliefs of the Aravanis. Although they called them-
selves a “third gender,” or superwomen, they also
believed that gender transformation is only a male
prerogative, a part of patriarchal privilege.
The striking parallel between the Aravanis and
the Brahmins suggests that cultural beliefs about gen-
der are distributed widely across various sections of
society, but social location does influence the de-
gree to which gender is essentialized. The transgres-
sive nature of Aravani identity influences the way
they think about gender role transgressions. How-
ever, when it comes to gender transformation, they al-
most militantly essentialize female identity. Also, the
Aravanis’ beliefs about the fluidity of male gender
identity validate their own quest to become women
(Nanda, 1990). They strongly identify themselves with
women, and, in fact, call themselves as “hyperwomen”
(Jaffrey, 1996) because they embody hyperfeminine
qualities. Their views are very close to those of the
dominant Brahmin group’s perception of gender.
Ironically, the “hyperfeminine” self-construction of
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the Aravanis is rooted in their hyperpatriarchal be-
liefs about female gender. In some ways the Aravanis
internalize patriarchal ideology to an even greater ex-
tent than do heterosexuals. To a certain degree, these
patriarchal beliefs subvert the empowering potentials
of marginalized epistemologies.
Conclusions
Two gender tasks were used to explore essen-
tialist beliefs about gender among the Aravanis. The
data show that the Aravanis tolerated both male and
female gender transgressions, however they believed
in a fluid male identity that allows gender transfor-
mations for males, but not for females, except in the
case of a transcendental mechanism such as Karma.
That is, women who had performed good Karma are
more likely to become male in the next life, whereas
good Karma was less likely to change a man into a
woman in the next life. This is consistent with their
belief that men can become women in this life and
do not have to wait for next life, as women do. The
Aravanis’ beliefs about gender are complex and mul-
tilayered. Although they held on to essentialist beliefs
about gender in the gender transformation task, they
did not extend these essentialist beliefs to their evalu-
ation of gender transgressions. Essentialist notions of
gender are complex and dynamic. They are shaped by
social location, culture, and marginalized experience.
APPENDIX A: GENDER TRANSGRESSION
TASK
Male gender Female gender
transgression transgression
1. Started growing 1. Started growing short
long hair hair like boys
2. Started wearing 2. Wanted to drive
a skirt motorbikes
3. Wanted to wear bangles 3. Started wearing pants
4. Wanted to wear flowers 4. Wanted to do
in his hair carpentry work
5. Wanted to become 5. Wanted to
a cook play cricket
6. Wanted to join a 6. Wanted to play
Bharathanatyam class with boys
7. Wanted to become 7. Wanted to join
a nurse the military
8. Wanted to play 8. Wanted to learn to
with girls be a car mechanic
APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTION OF GENDER
TRANSFORMATION MECHANISMS
Girija is the only child for her parents. Her father
is a devoted priest in the Krishnan temple She is also a
devotee of Krishnan. She wanted to become a priest
after her father’s retirement. She joined a Sanskrit
school and learned all the Vedas. When she told her
friends about wanting to become a priest, her friends
told her only boys can become a priest; she wondered
whether she can become a priest. She asked several
people whether she can become a boy to become a
priest.
GTR1 (by superficial change): One person told her
that if she dresses like a boy and grows short hair she
will become a boy.
1 2 3 4 5
Least Likely to change Most likely to change
GTR 2 (by surgery): One person told her that she can
go to a hospital and the doctor can perform a surgery
that will change her into a boy.
1 2 3 4 5
Least Likely to change Most likely to change
GTR3 (by a Guru): One person told her that she can
go to a Guru and the Guru can chant a mantra and
perform a ceremony that will change her into a boy.
1 2 3 4 5
Least Likely to change Most likely to change
GTR4 (by good Karma): One person told her that if
she does lot of good deeds in this life, in her next life
she will be born as a boy and she can become a priest
then.
1 2 3 4 5
Least Likely to change Most likely to change
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